Have the Taliban changed?

No.

What is the relationship between al Qaeda and the Taliban?

The fundamental justification for the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001 was that the Taliban had provided sanctuary for al Qaeda, and enabled the 9/11 attacks. Notwithstanding turbulent moments, the relationship between the Taliban and al Qaeda was one of proactive, and material support as set out in the 9/11 Commission Report (p.66-7):

Al Qaeda members could travel freely within the country, enter and exit it without visas or any immigration procedures, purchase and import vehicles and weapons, and enjoy the use of official Afghan Ministry of Defense license plates.Al Qaeda also used the Afghan state-owned Ariana Airlines to courier money into the country… The alliance with the Taliban provided al Qaeda a sanctuary in which to train and indoctrinate fighters and terrorists, import weapons, forge ties with other jihad groups and leaders, and plot and staff terrorist schemes…

U.S. intelligence estimates put the total number of fighters who underwent instruction in Bin Ladin–supported camps in Afghanistan from 1996 through [to] 9/11 at 10,000 to 20,000.

Thomas Hegghammer (2013) created his own dataset of Western terror plots using datasets from seven previous studies (these include foiled attacks) for the period 1990 to 2010. He found that one in nine foreign fighters return and attempt to carry out an attack - 1 in 9 may be considered as a relatively small number, but these individuals are much more lethal so the fact that thousands trained at these camps represented a significant threat. Indeed, Mohammed Sidique Khan, the ring leader of the 7/7 bombings in London (and who was also potentially involved in the bombing of Mike’s Place in Tel Aviv in 2003), was trained in an Afghan camp in 2001.

Following the intervention in 2001, Bin Laden continued to give baya (an oath of allegiance) to Mullah Omar. Bin Laden’s successor, al-Zawahiri, gave the same oath of allegiance to Mullah Omar. Incidentally, the Taliban had kept Mullah Omar’s death a secret for a long while so al-Zawahiri was almost certainly swearing allegiance to a dead man (though he renewed his pledge to Mullah Omar’s successor, and also renewed his pledge to the current Taliban head honcho, Mullah Akhundzada).

These were not mere pleasantries; the bromance between the Taliban and Al Qaeda provided material benefits to a terrorist organisation which has it sights on terrorist attacks in the West. For example, in 2015 U.S and Afghan National Army (ANA) forces raided several al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) camps in Afghanistan, including “one training area that sprawled over 30 square miles and another small one that was about one square mile”. AQIS leaders were sporadically killed in Taliban controlled areas and embedded within Taliban units in their fight against coalition forces.

Indeed, the idea that the Taliban and al Qaeda can be disaggregated ignores the level of integration and interwoven nature of the organisations. al Qaeda leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid has explained that their “participation in Jihad inside Afghanistan is that we are under the command of the Islamic Emirate [the Taliban] and under the field leaders in the Islamic Emirate”.

Ah, but what about the Doha Agreement negotiated by the Trump administration?

The public parts of the Doha Agreement negotiated by the Trump administration set out that the Taliban would “not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qa’ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the United States and its allies.” The full withdrawal was conditional on this part of the Agreement being implemented. The Taliban brazenly violated and breached this part of the agreement.

We know this because of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established by the UN to help with the monitoring and enforcement of sanctions against al Qaeda. In 2021, well over a year after the Doha Agreement, their report noted:

..the Taliban and Al-Qaida remain closely aligned and show no indication of breaking ties. Member States report no material change to this relationship, which has grown deeper as a consequence of personal bonds of marriage and shared partnership in struggle, now cemented through second generational ties.

Again, this is not mere lip service - the findings of the UN Team from 2020 and 2021 could not be clearer:

• al Qaida is resident in at least 15 Afghan provinces courtesy of the Taliban, and they were establishing new training camps in the east of the country under the Taliban’s control.

• Members of the group have been relocated to more remote areas by the Taliban to avoid potential exposure and targeting.

• AQIS operates under the Taliban umbrella from Kandahar, Helmand and Nimruz provinces.

• The regularity of meetings between Al-Qaida seniors and the Taliban “made any notion of a break between the two mere fiction”.

During the negotiations, the Taliban claimed they would “welcome” operations against al Qaeda; a full 6 months later, the UN Team’s head was publicly stating that Al-Qaeda continues to be "heavily embedded" within the Taliban in Afghanistan and confirmed that “the Taliban promised al-Qaeda in the run-up to the US agreement that the two groups would remain allies”.

Now that the Taliban have re-declared their Islamic Emirate and have free rein, nothing changes this conclusion. Sirajuddin Haqqani, a man who the UN confirms is “a member of the wider Al-Qaida leadership” is now the “Minister of Interior”, having been in the Taliban’s Shura council. Sirajuddin’s brother,¹ Khalil Haqqani has been appointed as Minister for Refugees - like his brother, he has also “acted on behalf of al-Qaeda and has been linked to al-Qaeda military operations.” Sirajuddin, not content with material support to al Qaeda, even published a 144 page pamphlet which according to Newsweek set out:

Aspiring jihadists should emulate the group’s ability to “stay and live among people who are against our faith and ideology, like those militants operating in Europe and the U.S.,” the book urges: “Blend in, shave, wear Western dress, be patient.” … As for targets, it advises, “You should attack the enemy’s weaker points, such as economic targets like the World Trade Center and diplomatic targets like the U.S. embassies in Africa.”

That a person who wrote these words and who is member of the leadership of al Qaeda is now in the Taliban government should be the final nail in the coffin of those who seek to argue the Taliban have disavowed al Qaeda.

But the Taliban is fighting ISIS, isn’t that a good thing?

In the long line of copes of justifying the withdrawal was the argument that the Taliban have fought, and continue to fight, ISIS. In a very crude sense, a dead member of ISIS is a good member of ISIS. But the argument that we should align with the Taliban because of their hostilities with ISIS is as ignorant as it is short sighted.

First, the premise relies the dubious idea that there is no other plausible military intervention against ISIS including one that tries to suppress, or at the very least localise, both al Qaeda and ISIS - there is a strategy that could work. (Relatedly, the idea that ‘on the horizon’ attacks against al Qaeda and ISIS provide a workable or preferable way forward are bunk: there are little arrangements for U.S. presence in neighbouring countries, and no supporting domestic force - making the Somalia, Iraq, Mali or Pakistan playbooks unsuitable).

Second, even ignoring their emboldening of al Qaeda, is the question of whether the Taliban is a capable force against ISIS. The former Chief of Defence General Lord Richards has said that “there will be ungoverned space opened up in Afghanistan which those groups will exploit and the ability of the Taliban to actually manage them will be minimal”. He has much evidence in his favour. In this context, it is worth noting that rolling back ISIS from Iraq relied on significant Western military pressure, along with the assistance of domestic forces. Rather stupidly, as the Taliban swept through the country they freed all prisoners including 2,000 members of ISIS, a single act which undid the good work of the coalition and ANA overnight and will further undermine the Taliban’s ability to control ISIS in Afghanistan. Attacks by ISIS in Afghanistan have unsurprisingly increased since the withdrawal.

It is no response to say that the defeat of the ANA shows the Taliban is a force to be reckoned with. There were many failures which led to the fall of Kabul, chief among them was the weakness of the ANA itself which was itself related to a series of pusillanimous U.S. actions. Once it became clear that the U.S was committed to unconditional withdrawal, failure was inevitable, and Trump’s release of almost 5,000 Taliban prisoners, including foot soldiers added fuel to the fire. To take one example, the Afghan air force was reliant on U.S. contractors - all of whom started to withdraw. Shockingly, these contracts took “proprietary software and weapons systems with them. They physically removed our helicopter missile-defense system. Access to the software that we relied on to track our vehicles, weapons and personnel also disappeared. Real-time intelligence on targets went out the window, too.” But there were issues even before the withdrawal according to a recently published memo: in 2019, contractors lost access to Shindand Air Base in western Afghanistan because of a rule prohibiting contractors from working at bases not controlled by U.S. or coalition forces, the report states. But in any event, the ANA and ISIS should not be compared - one was trying to hold territory and governance, the other is a risk even where it does not achieve that aim.

Third, even ignoring the Taliban’s ability to fight ISIS and their support for al Qaeda, the Taliban gives material protection and support to other terrorist organisations capable and willing to attack the West. For example, the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU) operates closely with the Taliban. The IJU was the organisation behind the foiled German plot against Frankfurt Airport, Ramstein airbase and “a disco full of sluts”. The IJU is not unique: the Talban also supports, and integrates within their own units, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the TTP. Whilst their relationship is not smooth sailing, as recently as December 2021, the TTP were claiming to be a branch of the Taliban.

Like its relationship with al Qaeda, the Taliban’s relationship with these organisations has blurred lines and interwoven chains of command. Indeed, Sirajuddin Haqanni once boasted that, unlike President Karzai, the Arab and other foreign groups operating alongside him were “under his control”. Amusingly, when Germany’s first suicide bomber, Cüneyt Çiftçi, carried out his attack on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan, both the Taliban and the IJU claimed responsibility - an encapsulation of their integrated relationship. It is little surprise that the Director General of M15 has said that terrorists would be “emboldened” by the Taliban’s takeover.

Have the Taliban become less likely to commit violence or barbarism?

Taliban leaders have announced.. Afghans can return to Kabul without fear, and that Afghanistan is the common home of all Afghans. We take those statements as an indication that the Taliban intends to respect the rights of all Afghans.

So said the State Department… in 1996. Those too ignorant to know the Taliban’s statements about treating all Afghans with mercy in the 1990s, and those too ignorant to look at areas under Taliban control since 2015, seem to think the Taliban returned as kinder, gentler and benign and bearded.

It’s a pipe dream. The Taliban quickly started its murders of those affiliated with the former regime notwithstanding its transparently self-serving announcements, girls were restricted from schools purportedly on a temporary basis (they were of course have you on, its permanent), woman banned from leaving their homes, the internet connection for areas with the persecuted Hazara minority group cut off (including land seizures), journalists attacked and tortured, reports of sex slaves, cruel and barbaric punishments returned, music being banned - most of this within 4 days of the fall of Kabul. It continues to get worse.

To a certain extent this line was only half seriously implied by the ‘anti-imperialist’ left, and was a mere meme buoyed by videos of barbarians on dodgems. But its clear that understating the impacts of the Taliban - the organisation that enabled 9/11, is responsible the deaths of thousands of American and British soldiers - is at least an anti-interventionist cope.

Did Western soldiers die in vain?

No. Scott Sumner put it succinctly:

And the war was a major success:

1.  The Taliban government was quickly toppled.

2.  Al Qaeda was put on the run, weakening its capability.

3.  Later on, a successful attack on Al Qaeda was launched from Afghanistan, killing Bin Ladin at his hideout in Pakistan.

4.  For the next 20 years, the Taliban was denied power in Afghanistan.

If the Taliban takes power again next week, does that mean the war was a failure?  Of course not.  Consider the analogy of someone who serves 20 years in prison for 2nd degree murder.  One critic might carp that the last 15 years was a waste of taxpayer money, as even 5 years in prison is plenty of deterrence.  Another critic might claim that the sentence was ineffective, as the murderer is now out and free to murder again.  Both views are wrong—as 20 years is a reasonable deterrence for 2nd degree murder.  Any specific figure is arbitrary, but you must choose some sort of sentence.

The war was a success, as Al Qaeda was badly damaged and the Taliban was severely punished… We’ve been almost free of terrorism since 2001.  It’s not just that flying didn’t become more dangerous; it became far safer than before 9/11. The war in Afghanistan deterred future terrorist organizations (such as ISIS) from directly attacking the US homeland.  Those groups may use suicide attackers, but the organizations themselves are not suicidal.

And leaving aside this clear win, we can take solace in the face that Afghanistan was made better by the intervention:

• Since 2001, more than 90 percent of children are now immunized against polio. Under-5 mortality has dropped by 26 percent, to 191 deaths per 1,000 live births,and deaths of infants before age 1 have dropped by 22 percent, to 129 deaths per 1,000 live births. The number of TB treatment facilities has tripled, and TB cases have fallen by 60 percent.

• The  population with no access to electricity declined from 94% in 2001 to 42% in 2006 to 33% in 2009. 

• When USAID arrived in 2002, there were only 50 kilometers of intact paved roads. To date, USAID has built or rehabilitated approximately 2,700 kilometers of roads, including 715 kilometers of the Ring Road, national highways, and provincial and rural roads.

• More than 500 square kilometres of land have been released back to Afghans, free of mines and remnants of war. Since 2007, more than half a million vulnerable Afghans living in mine-affected areas have received mine-risk education.

• Before the U.S. occupation, a telephone system barely existed in Afghanistan. Today, one in three Afghans has a cell phone. Afghans once had access to no media outlets apart from the Taliban's Voice of Sharia radio network. Now there are, in the words of the BBC, "scores of radio stations, dozens of TV stations and some 100 active press titles."

It does not matter that these things do not, in isolation, justify military intervention nor that some of these trends will reverse overtime, but there is a pride we should take in enabling people being immunised, the roads and infrastructure built, the countless saved lives.

1. Incidentally, that the Haqqani brothers are now in the Taliban’s government shows how meaningless the debate about whether the so-called “Haqqani network” are, or are not, separate from the Taliban: the Haqqanis helped Bin Laden escape in 2001, the Taliban called on the Haaqanis to win battles as far back as Mazar-e-Sharif in 1996, and another Haaqani brother, Anas Haqqani, spat back “We are the Taliban” when asked about the distinction between the two groups. These factions have always had some level of autonomy, but this incestuous relationship between all of them - al Qaeda, the Haqqanis and the Taliban - shows how attempts to downplay the material support for one another are futile.